PIERRE, S.D. (KELO) — A victim’s medical expenses covered by Medicaid don’t qualify for criminal restitution under existing South Dakota law, the state Supreme Court has determined.
The ruling came in the State v. Bryant decision that the justices publicly released last week.
A Minnehaha County jury convicted Mason Bryant on aggravated assault and simple assault after he stabbed a knife twice into the victim’s abdomen during a 2017 altercation.
Circuit Judge Jon Sogn sentenced Bryant to 12 years for aggravated assault and, finding Medicaid to be a victim under South Dakota law, ordered Bryant to pay $31,246.69 to Medicaid in restitution for the victim’s medical expenses.
Bryant’s attorney, Christopher Miles of the Minnehaha County Public Defender’s Office, appealed the Medicaid order, arguing Medicaid wasn’t a ‘person’ under state law and challenged several of the judge’s decisions that were made during the trial.
The record shows Bryant’s lawyer didn’t specifically object but raised the question of whether Bryant should have to pay restitution while also being sentenced to serve time in prison.
Supreme Court Justice Janine Kern wrote the court’s unanimous opinion. “Bryant did not properly advise the circuit court of the reason for his objection and, therefore, forfeited this issue for review on appeal,” she wrote.
But Justice Kern went on to examine whether the circuit judge committed “plain error.”
“Applying the plain language of the statute, we conclude that the circuit court erred by finding that Medicaid falls within the definition of ‘person’ set forth in SDCL 22-1-2(31) and that the circuit court erred by finding that it did,” Kern wrote.
For a judge to commit plain error requires meeting four conditions but Sogn’s actions didn’t, according to the decision. The justices went on to consider the broader legal question of whether Medicaid was eligible for restitution and decided that is a matter instead for the Legislature.
“Medicaid, like private insurers, is statutorily required to indemnify eligible recipients by providing
necessary coverage for medical expenses and is a third-party payor. SDCL 58-12- 26; SDCL 28-6-1. Yet, it does not fall within the Legislature’s definition of ‘persons’ in SDCL 22-1-2(31) entitled to receive restitution because it is neither an ‘association, limited liability company, corporation, firm, organization, partnership, or society.’ (Emphasis added.) We cannot lift our judicial pens and amend
unambiguous statutes. Instead, we leave that task to the body elected to make laws,” Kern wrote.
She added, “The circuit court required Bryant to pay restitution in the amount of $31,246.69 to Medicaid as reimbursement for Rogers’s medical care. The restitution order, which the court imposed after his conviction, did not affect the outcome of Bryant’s jury trial, and we are not convinced that the court’s restitution order impacts Bryant’s substantial rights.”
She continued, “The order also does not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, which is required to satisfy prong four of the plain error analysis. There is nothing illegitimate about requiring Bryant to reimburse Medicaid for the medical expenses Rogers incurred as a result of Bryant’s decision to stab Rogers twice in the abdomen. We will not exercise our discretion to notice the error. We, therefore, deny his request to remand the case to the circuit
court to vacate the restitution award.”
The justices decided Bryant’s other complaints about the judge’s actions lacked merit.